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ABSTRACT
Performance Evaluation of Byzantine Fault Detection in Primary/Backup Systems
by Sushant Mane
ZooKeeper masks crash failure of servers to provide a highly available, distributed coordi-
nation kernel; however, in production, not all failures are crash failures. Bugs in underlying
software systems and hardware can corrupt the ZooKeeper replicas, leading to a data
loss. Since ZooKeeper is used as a ‘source of truth’ for mission-critical applications, it
should handle such arbitrary faults to safeguard reliability. Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT)
protocols were developed to handle such faults. However, these protocols are not suitable
to build practical systems as they are expensive in all important dimensions: development,
deployment, complexity, and performance. ZooKeeper takes an alternative approach that
focuses on detecting faulty behavior rather than tolerating it and thus providing improved
reliability without paying the full expense of BFT protocols. In this thesis, we studied
various techniques used for detecting non-malicious Byzantine faults in the ZooKeeper.
We also analyzed the impact of using these techniques on the reliability and the perfor-
mance of the overall system. Our evaluation shows that a realtime digest-based fault
detection technique can be employed in the production to provide improved reliability
with a minimal performance penalty and no additional operational cost. We hope that
our analysis and evaluation can help guide the design of next-generation primary-backup
systems aiming to provide high reliability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
ZooKeeper is a critical component of modern computing infrastructure. It is widely used as
the source of truth for building distributed applications [15, 36, 41]. ZooKeeper replicates
data to provide high availability, reliability, and performance. Replications allow it to handle
failures of a bounded number of servers. ZooKeeper assumes a crash-recovery failure
model: servers in an ensemble may fail to respond but they never respond incorrectly, and
they may start responding after some unknown time [22, 25]. In production, however, not
all failures are crash failures. For example, bugs in code, operating system, hardware, or
underlying software such as JVM can corrupt the replica state [11, 20, 21, 30, 31, 32, 37, 42].
The replica corruption leads to an incorrect server response, which violates the assumption
that the servers never respond incorrectly. System state corruptions, unlike crash failures,
are not always detectable clients. Since ZooKeeper assumes key responsibilities, detecting
arbitrary faults early on is essential to safeguard reliability and correctness.
Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols such as PBFT [9, 10], Q/U [1], HQ
[17], Zyzzyva [28], Aardvark [13] were developed to mask the bounded number of faulty
components that exhibit arbitrary behavior in distributed systems [29, 40]. Despite the
guarantees provided by BFT protocols, they are usually not used to build production
systems for the following reasons. The BFT systems require more replicas than the crash
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tolerant protocols: at least 35 + 1 replicas are required for BFT as opposed to 25 + 1 in
crash-stop systems. The BFT protocols also require N-independent implementations of
service and underlying software stack as they assume that the nodes fail independently of
each other. Since BFT protocols are complex, it is challenging to correctly translate the
protocol specication into the implementation. Moreover, these protocols increase the
complexity of systems and incur a signicant performance penalty.
On the one hand, given the tremendous cost and complexity, the adoption of BFT
protocols in already stable systems such as ZooKeeper is not a practical choice. On the
other hand, ignoring arbitrary faults could lead to data loss and service outages. Therefore,
in order to provide improved reliability a more pragmatic approach is required.
Figure 1.1: Data loss due to corruption propagation
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1.1 Background
ZooKeeper is usually run inside of trusted environments and maintained by a core team
of trusted developers. Its protocol is designed and subjected to various levels of reviews
and modeling to ensure correctness. Best practices such as code review and various levels
of testing are used to ensure that the implementation matches the protocol specication.
In spite of this, failures occur due to byzantine faults. That is bugs in code, hardware,
operating system, conguration, and more can produce an incorrect system state. For
example, in Figure 1.1, undetected byzantine fault corrupts replica '2. The corrupted state
of '2 is then propagated to new replicas '4 and '5. This can result in an irrecoverable data
loss when healthy replicas '1 and '3 are decommissioned.
Figure 1.2: Client failure due to corruption propagation
Moreover, as shown in Figure 1.2, system state corruptions can be propagated to
clients as well. The propagation of corruption to clients can cause cascading failures and
service outages.
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Handling byzantine faults early on is a key to avoiding catastrophic failures.
Since tolerating byzantine faults is expensive, some systems take an alternative approach
that relies on fault detection to deal with arbitrary behavior of the system. Doing Byzantine
fault detection is cheaper than byzantine fault tolerance as detection doesn’t require the full
expense of BFT protocols. The Apache ZooKeeper uses a fault detection-based approach
for handling byzantine faults. However, these fault detection techniques detect only a
subset of byzantine faults, namely, non-malicious byzantine faults.
Reed and Lyu [8] implemented non-malicious byzantine fault detection tech-
niques in ZooKeeper. They were able to implement fault detection techniques in ZooKeeper
with minor development costs. In the rest of the paper, we refer to non-malicious byzantine
faults as byzantine faults.
1.2 Research Objectives
The research objective of this work is to study and evaluate non-malicious byzantine fault
detection techniques used in the ZooKeeper. In particular, we will answer the following
questions:
1. What is the cost of using AdHASH based online consistency checker for detecting
non-malicious byzantine faults in ZooKeeper?
2. What is the cost of doing real-time byzantine fault detection?
3. What’s the trade-o of using a weak hash function vs. a strong hash function in AdHASH
for byzantine fault detection?
4. How do dierent request sizes impact the performance when using byzantine fault
detection?
10
Chapter 2
Literature Review
A reliable distributed system must handle the failure of some of its components. The faulty
components provide conicting information or send corrupt messages to dierent parts of
the system. Lamport et al. formulated this type of behavior, as the Byzantine Generals
Problem [29]. They also proposed several algorithms to handle these failures and proved
that they can be used to build reliable distributed systems in synchronous environments.
However, these solutions are expensive both in time and the number of messages used
for communication. In addition to this, these solutions cannot be used in asynchronous
settings like the Internet and are extremely slow to build practical systems [9].
2.1 Agreement-based Protocols
Agreement-based protocols rst have replicas agree on the order of a new request and
then have them execute that request according to the agreed order. Castro and Liskov
proposed a state machine replication-based protocol, namely, Practical Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (PBFT) protocol that tolerates Byzantine faults [10]. Their algorithm works
in asynchronous environments and oers both liveness and safety given 25 + 1 servers
out of 35 + 1 are non-faulty: i.e., only 5 servers can be simultaneously Byzantine faulty.
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One of the disadvantages of this approach is that to mask software errors, it requires
N-version programming: i.e., N dierent implementations of the same software, which is
not very practical [12, 27]. Therefore, despite being the landmark solution for Byzantine
fault tolerance, this protocol has failed to gain wide adoption. Yin et. al [40] proposed
separation of the agreement (request ordering) from the execution (request processing).
This separation allows the use of the same agreement component for various replication
tasks and reduces the number of execution replicas to 25 + 1.
Clement et al. proposed the UpRight library that aimed to make BFT protocols
simple and easy to adopt by existing applications [14]. Using the UpRight library, they built
the BFT version of ZooKeeper and Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). In contrast to
PBFT, UpRight favors simplicity for adoption. However, the performance of UpRight is
signicantly slower than other systems and consumes more resources.
2.2 Quorum-based Protocols
Abd-El-Malek et al. proposed Query/Update (Q/U): a single-phase quorum-based optimistic
protocol that allows building fault-scalable BFT services [1]. In contrast to the PBFT, Q/U
is a single-phase, optimistic protocol. Q/U protocol is ecient and works in asynchronous
environments. It performs better under low contention. The major advantage of Q/U is
that it demonstrates better performance when the number of Byzantine faults tolerated
increases. The bottleneck in Q/U is resolving conicting writes; since it is an expensive
operation and may degrade performance signicantly. Another issue with the Q/U protocol
is that it requires 55 + 1 servers to handle 5 Byzantine faulty components; in contrast,
PBFT requires only 35 + 1 servers.
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2.3 Hybrid Protocols
Cowling et al. presented a Hybrid Quorum (HQ) protocol that overcomes shortcomings
of state-machine-based approach (quadratic communication cost) and quorum-based ap-
proach (a large number of replicas) [17]. As compared to Q/U, HQ requires fewer replicas:
i.e., only 35 + 1 replicas to tolerate 5 Byzantine failures but needs more rounds during
normal execution. Both Q/U and HQ cannot batch concurrent requests and are expensive
if there is a contention [39].
In an attempt to reduce the cost and simplify the design, Kotla et al. proposed
Zyzzyva: a speculative BFT protocol [28]. In traditional protocols, the agreement comes
before the execution; however, Zyzzyva takes an optimistic approach in which the execu-
tion takes place without an agreement, followed by the verication of the execution for
consistency. In Zyzzyva, the client plays a major role. Clients help to verify consistency by
enabling non-faulty servers to converge on a single total order of requests. This approach
enables Zyzzyva to achieve high performance in terms of both throughput and latency.
Unfortunately, Zyzzyva’s view-change protocol fails to provide safety against a faulty
leader [2]. When compared with PBFT, Zyzzyva oers high throughput; however, PBFT
oers a more predictable performance. One common drawback of Q/U, HQ, and Zyzzyva
is that the replicas rely on the clients to reach an agreement. This is concerning because if
the client is faulty, then replicas may produce an incorrect system state.
This review discusses the protocols to make systems Byzantine fault-tolerant.
Agreement-based BFT protocols require a minimum of 35 + 1 servers to tolerate 5 server
failures which are 25 fewer servers than the quorum-based BFT protocols. On the other
hand, quorum-based protocols are more ecient and provide higher throughput than
agreement-based protocols. The hybrid approach seems quite attractive to build BFT
systems. However, these protocols are complicated. Also, the cost of developing and
deploying BFT services using these protocols makes them impractical. Nonetheless, when
high reliability is required, systems need to handle arbitrary behaviors.
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Chapter 3
Fault Model
For the purpose of Byzantine fault detection, we consider replicas to be of two types:
correct (consistent) replicas and faulty (inconsistent) replicas. A replica is said to be correct
if its state is consistent with other replicas in an ensemble. We use the term “consistent"
in the sense that data is identical on all the replicas. On the other hand, a faulty replica
diverges from the correct replicas because of a corrupt state caused by byzantine failures.
Both these terms will be explained in detail in the following sections.
3.1 Correct Replicas
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a ZooKeeper service with ve servers. In Figure 3.1, '1 is
the leader replica and it updates its state to )1 after processing transaction with IG83 = 1.
Upon applying transaction with IG83 = 1, the follower replicas '2, '3, '4, and '5 also
change their states to )1. Every replica that successfully updates its state to )1 after
applying a transaction with IG83 = 1 is considered to be a correct replica. Similarly, after
applying a transaction with IG83 = 2 every replica updates its state to )2 and thus all
replicas are in a consistent state until that point in time. In summary, a replica ' is said to
be in a consistent or correct state if after applying transaction with IG83 = = its state results
14
Figure 3.1: ZooKeeper service with correct (consistent) replicas
in )= and every other correct replica also results in )= upon processing transaction =.
3.1.1 Lagging Replicas
One important thing to note is that replicas in an ensemble might be at dierent points
of execution. This means that at the instance of time ) some replicas may not have
applied or even received some transactions yet, whereas other replicas may have applied
all the transactions (up-to-date state). We call replicas that lag behind up-to-date replicas
as “lagging replicas". In Figure 3.1, '2 and '3 are lagging replicas. However, this does
not mean that these replicas are in an inconsistent state. For instance, the last applied
transaction to '4 is IG83 = 3 and its state is )3 which is also the same as that of other
correct replicas when they were at IG83 = 3. Similarly, the last applied transaction to '2 is
IG83 = 4 and its state is )4 which is the same as that of other correct, up-to-date replicas
when they were at IG83 = 4. Since both '2 and '4 have a consistent state until the last
transaction applied to their state, they are considered as correct replicas.
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3.2 Faulty Replicas
Figure 3.2: ZooKeeper service with one faulty (corrupt) replica
Figure 3.2 shows a ZooKeeper service with one faulty replica. After applying
transaction with IG83 = 2 every replica updates its state to )2 and thus all replicas are
in a consistent state until that point in time. However, after applying transaction with
IG83 = 3, replicas '1, '2, '3 and '4 update their state to )3, whereas replica '5’s state
results in ) ′
3
. This means that '5’s state has diverged from that of other correct replicas.
We refer to such diverged replicas as faulty or corrupt replicas.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we dened two types of replicas: correct replicas and faulty replicas. In the
next chapter, we will discuss three dierent Byzantine fault detection techniques that rely
on these denitions to detect inconsistencies in the ZooKeeper replicas.
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Chapter 4
Non-Malicious Byzantine Fault
Detection
In this chapter, we will discuss three dierent Byzantine fault detection techniques used in
the ZooKeeper. However, we will rst briey discuss the ZooKeeper data model.
ZooKeeper service is composed of an ensemble of replica servers. Each replica
consists of a set of data nodes, namely, znodes [22]. The znodes are organized in a
hierarchical structure called DataTree. A DataTree is an in-memory data structure, and
it represents the state of a replica. There are two types of znodes: regular znodes and
ephemeral znodes. All regular znodes can have children. The clients add, read, update, and
delete the znodes using read and write APIs.
Only write requests modify the state of replicas and require coordination among
the servers in an ensemble. All write requests are forwarded to and processed through
the leader. Upon receiving write requests, the leader prepares a transaction capturing the
changes to the state of a replica. The leader then uses ZAB protocol [25, 26] to replicate a
new state captured in a transaction on all follower replicas. A fuzzy copy of DataTree is
saved periodically to a snapshot le. All replicas maintain a transaction log stored on a
persistent storage device.
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In the following sections, we will discuss three modes of non-malicious byzantine
fault detections: Oine comparisons, Online Comparisons, and Realtime Detection. We
will also look at their advantages and disadvantages. In the last section, we will cover the
incremental hashing algorithm used in online and real-time detection.
4.1 Oline Comparisons
One way to nd out whether replicas have diverged is by comparing the data of replicas.
To this end, ZooKeeper employs an external consistency checker. It runs periodically
outside of the ZooKeeper service. When a consistency checker runs, it rst downloads the
data (snapshots and transaction logs of the replicas. It then deserializes the DataTree of
each replica by using the corresponding snapshot le. The ZooKeeper snapshots are fuzzy,
and they do not reect the exact state of replica DataTree at any point in time.
Figure 4.1: External consistency checker veries that all replicas have identical data
For instance, in Figure 4.1, replica '1 has data until transaction )5 and it might
contain some changes from transaction)6 and onward. Similarity, '2 and '3 have data until
transaction )3 and )4 respectively and they may have some changes from the transactions
being processed when their snapshots were taken. Therefore for every DataTree, the
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checker replays transactions, in order, from the corresponding transaction log le of that
replica. Replicas will be at the same point in time once the transactions until)= are replayed
for all of them. The consistency checker computes the digest of each DataTree. It uses
these digests for state comparisons. If replicas have an identical copy of DataTree then
they will produce the same digest. In Figure 4.1, all replicas produce the same digest 3 ,
and hence the checker concludes that replicas are consistent
On the other hand, if a replica has a dierent copy of data, it will produce a
dierent digest. The digest of such a replica will mismatch with the digest of other replicas.
In Figure 4.2, replica '3’s transaction log contains a corrupt transaction, )6. When )6 is
applied to the '3’s DataTree, it causes '3 to diverge from other replicas in the ensemble.
Due to this '3 produces digest 3
′
whereas both '1 and '2 produce digest 3 . Since the digest
of '3 mismatch with other replicas, the consistency checker concludes that '3 is a faulty
replica.
Figure 4.2: External consistency checker detects faulty replica
The advantage of using the external consistency checker is that it does impact
ZooKeeper’s performance as it runs outside of the ZooKeeper service. Also, the develop-
ment cost is minimal as no change is needed to the core ZooKeeper source code. However,
this approach has several disadvantages. First, every time the consistency checker runs, all
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ZooKeeper replicas need to be stopped at the same time to download their data. Second,
copying data every time the consistency checker runs consumes resources such as network
bandwidth. Third, a faulty replica might serve the corrupt responses i.e. it may propagate
the corruption until the consistency checker runs.
4.2 Online Comparisons
In online consistency check mode, as shown in Figure 4.3 every replica maintains a digest of
its DataTree and a digest log. The digest log contains a list of historical digests (ngerprint
or hash) and their corresponding metadata such as zxids (i.e., zxid of the last transaction
applied to the DataTree when the digest was calculated).
Figure 4.3: Replicas with their digest logs
After applying a transaction to the DataTree replicas update their DataTree’s
digest. As shown in Figure 4.4 step 6, upon applying a transaction C1 to the DataTree each
replica computes a new digest and stores it along with the DataTree. After every  xed
number of transactions, replicas add the current digest and corresponding zxid to the
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digest log. For example, in Figure 4.3 after every 128 transactions replicas add digests to
their digest log. As shown in Figure 4.4, the auditor, which is scheduled to run periodically,
collects recent digest log entries from each replica. It compares the digests corresponding
to the last zxid that was applied to all the replicas. At the time ) 1 and ) 2 the digests from
all the replicas match. If digest for any replica is dierent from the majority digests then
the auditor reports digest mismatch. For example, at time )< the digest ′= of replica '3
does not match with the digest = of replica '1 and '2; hence the auditor reports digest
mismatch for '3.
Figure 4.4: Online consistency verication using external auditor
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Computing a full digest from the scratch upon every transaction is an expensive
operation. Therefore, this fault detection technique uses an incremental hashing algorithm,
AdHASH, to compute the digests. The AdHASH algorithm is described in section 4.4.
The major advantage of this method over the oine external consistency checker
is that there is no need to download huge data of ZooKeeper replicas every time we want
to check replicas for inconsistencies. Also, the auditor can be scheduled to run more
frequently as the amount of data transferred from replicas to the auditor is comparatively
very small and it can be served by replicas with minimal interruption. Because of this, the
auditor can help in catching faulty replicas sooner than the external consistency checker
and thereby substantially reduces the chances of serving corrupt data to the clients. This
technique also provides a context such as transaction id which makes it easier to investigate
the root cause of the state corruption.
Since every replica needs to compute and update its digest on every transaction,
this aects the overall throughput. The impact on performance varies depending on the
hash function used in AdHASH and the transaction data size. Also, to store digests some
additional memory for DataTree and space for snapshots and transaction logs is required;
however, compared to the rest of replica data it is a trivial amount of data. Similar to the
external checker, the main disadvantage of this method is that by the time a faulty replica
is detected it might already have served the corrupt data to the clients.
4.3 Realtime Detection
In order to avoid serving corrupt data to the clients, it is essential to detect faults as soon as
they occur. To that end, ZooKeeper uses a predictive digest mechanism to detect byzantine
faults in real-time. As shown in Figure 4.5, when preparing transaction proposal for C1 the
leader '1 also computes the digest 31 of DataTree when changes captured in transaction C1
are applied to it. The leader sends this digest as a part of the transaction proposal to the
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followers. When followers apply this transaction to their DataTree, they compute a new
digest of DataTree and check it with the leader’s digest. In Figure 4.5, both '2 and '3’s
digest after applying transaction C1 is 31, which is same as that of the leader’s digest 31.
After applying transaction C2, replica '2 computes digest which is same as that of leaders
digest; however, replica '3’s digest is 3
′
2
is dierent from the leaders digest 32. Since the
digest of '3 is dierent than the digest of the leader replica, we conclude that the '3 has
diverged from the leader replica.
Figure 4.5: Real-time consistency check
The main advantage of this technique is that it allows us to detect inconsistencies
as data is changing. With this technique, replicas can avoid serving corrupt data and can
prevent the propagation of corruption. In addition to this, when a faulty replica is detected,
we get a specic context like zxid, DataTree that helps in the root cause analysis of a
replica state corruption.
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In this method, the leader computes a predictive digest for each transaction.
This adds extra load on the CPU of the leader server. Furthermore, upon processing a
transaction, every replica in an ensemble updates its digest, and this adds an extra CPU load
on all replicas. Because of these reasons, doing real-time detection aects the performance
more than the online comparison method.
4.4 Incremental Hashing
A collision-free hash function is used to map long messages to a xed-length digest in
such a way that it is computationally infeasible to have the same digest for two dierent
messages. In order to compute digests of two dierent messages, we have to compute
digest from scratch for each message individually. Computing digests using cryptographic
hash functions is a computationally expensive operation. If these messages are related
to each other, for example, one message is a simple modication of another, we can use
incremental hash functions to speed up the digest calculation. This means that if message
G was hashed using an incremental hash function, then the hash for message G′ which is
a modication of message G is obtained by updating the hash of message G rather than
re-computing it from the scratch [7].
To summarize, when we have data that is composed of multiple blocks, for
example, G = G1 . . . G= and if we modify G to G
′
by changing G8 to G
′
8 then given 5 (G), G8, G′8
we should be able to compute 5 (G′) by simply updating 5 (G). Bellare et. al. [7] proposed
the randomize-then-combine paradigm for the construction of incremental hash functions
. It consists of two main phases: randomize (hash) phase and combine phase. According to
this paradigm, the message G is viewed as a sequence of blocks G = G1. . .G= . Each block G8
is then processed using a hashing function ℎ to produce output ~8 . These outputs are then
combined to compute the nal hash value ~ = ~1  ~2  · · ·  ~= .
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~ = ℎ(G1)  ℎ(G2)  · · ·  ℎ(G=)
The hashing function ℎ also acts as a compression function. Standard hash
functions such as CRC32, MD5, and SHA-256 can be used as randomizing functions. The
combine operation  is usually a group operation such as addition or multiplication. In the
next section, we will discuss AdHASH [7] which is based on the randomize-then-combine
paradigm.
Figure 4.6: Digest computation using AdHASH
4.4.1 AdHASH
As discussed earlier, the main advantage of using an incremental hash function is to speed
up the computation of new hash value calculation when there is a small update to the
input data. AdHASH uses addition as the combine operator in the randomize-and-combine
paradigm for construction. The addition operator is both fast and secure [7]. Its inverse
operator is subtraction and is used to update the hash value when input data is modied
by substitution or deletion.
Let’s take one example to understand how AdHASH works. Suppose our input
data is a string x = San Hose State University. Each word in this string is considered as
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a one block G1 = (0=, G2 = >B4, G3 = (C0C4, G4 = *=8E4AB8C~. As shown in Figure
4.6 every block is then processed via a hashing function such as CRC32, to produce
~1 = 1196908354, ~2 = 94739505, ~3 = 1649606143, ~4 = 4012344892. These outcomes are
added together to calculate the nal hash value ~ = 6953598894.
Figure 4.7: Updating digest when data changes
Now suppose we want to update the message G = (0= >B4 (C0C4 *=8E4AB8C~ to
become G′ = (0= >B4 (C0C4 *=8E4AB8C~ by changing block G2 = >B4 to G2 = >B4 . Given,
~ = 6953598894, ~2 = 94739505, and G
′
2
we can compute the new hash value as follows:
rst, process G′
2
= >B4 via hashing function to yield outcome ~′
2
= 2947306682. Then as
shown in Figure 4.7, to re-compute the new hash value, subtract the hash value of the
block to be removed from the old hash value and add the hash value of the new block.
~′ = ~  ~−18  ~′8
~′ = ~ − ~2 + ~′2
= 6953598894 − 94739505 + 2947306682
= 9806166071
(4.1)
Figure 4.8 shows that we get the same hash value if we compute it from the
scratch using AdHASH. In summary, when input data is changed by the addition of a
new block to it, we add the hash of a new block to the old hash value to get the new hash
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value. Similarly, when data is changed by deleting a block, then to get the new hash value
we subtract the hash value of a block to be removed from the old hash value. As seen in
the above example, we only need to compute the hash value of the block whose data is
modied and the time taken to compute the new hash value is proportional to the size of
change. This property is particularly very useful in cases where the size of input data is
large and changes made to it are comparatively small.
Figure 4.8: Calculating full digest from the scratch upon modication of the message
The security of any incremental hash function depends on the randomizing
function and the combine operator. The XOR operator cannot be used as a combine
operation since it is not collision resistant [7]. On the other hand, the addition operator is
both secure and ecient as the combine operation.
4.4.2 AdHASH in ZooKeeper
In this section, we will briey discuss how AdHASH is used to calculate the incremental
digest of a DataTree in ZooKeeper.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, DataTree is composed of multiple
znodes. Each such znode is considered as one block for computing tree digest. To get the
hash value of a znode, the digest calculator uses znodes path, stats, and data, if any. In the
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current implementation, the hash value is an 8-byte long integer.
When a new znode is created, we compute its hash value using a digest calculator.
This hash value is added to the old digest of DataTree to get a new digest. The hash values
of znodes are usually cached to avoid recomputation when that znode is updated or deleted.
Also, with caching, the overhead of AdHASH in the case of delete operations is just one
subtraction. When a znode is deleted, we remove its hash value from the old digest to get
an updated tree digest. When a znode is updated, we compute and add its new hash to the
tree digest and remove its old hash value.
The hash values of znodes are computed using the standard hash functions.
The default hash function is CRC-32. It produces an 8-byte long integer hash value. We
also added support for using MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512. The output of these
hash functions, however, is larger than the 8-bytes. Hence with these hash functions, we
consider only the rst 8 bytes for tree digest computation.
28
Chapter 5
Evaluation
As discussed in Chapter 4, in both online comparison via auditor and realtime detection,
we compute a digest on every operation that modies the state. However, computing a
digest on every transaction comes with a compute cost, which means that it aects the
overall performance of ZooKeeper. Doing byzantine fault-detection in production requires
it to be feasible from a performance standpoint. Therefore, in this chapter, we will analyze
how doing byzantine fault-detection impacts ZooKeeper’s performance. To that end, our
experimental evaluation seeks to answer the following questions:
1. What is the cost of using AdHASH based online consistency checker for detecting
non-malicious byzantine faults in ZooKeeper?
2. What is the cost of doing real-time byzantine fault detection?
3. What’s the trade-o of using a weak hash function vs. a strong hash function in
AdHASH for byzantine fault detection?
4. How do dierent request sizes impact the performance when using byzantine fault
detection?
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5.1 Experiment Setup
For our evaluation, we used a cluster of seven servers running the CentOS Linux (release
7.9.2009) operating system. Every server had an Intel Xeon X5570 processor (8 cores,
16 logical CPUs, 2.93GHz clock speed), 62GiB of DDR3 RAM, one SATA hard drive, one
NVMe SSD, and a gigabit ethernet. Servers used OpenJDK (version 14.0.2) as a Java runtime
environment.
Figure 5.1: Experimental Setup
All experiments were run using the benchmark tool provided in Apache ZooKeeper
source code [5]. We used Apache ZooKeeper version 3.7.0 (development branch commit
7f66c7680) with additional changes to support the use of various hash functions for com-
puting the incremental digest. As shown in Figure 5.1, we used an ensemble of three
ZooKeeper servers R1, R2, and R3, hosted on machines N1, N2, and N3, respectively. We
congured every replica server to use a dedicated SSD for transaction logs and a dedicated
HDD for snapshots. We used 3 machines (N4-N6) to simulate 900 load-generating clients
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(C001 - C900), i.e., each machine ran 300 simultaneous clients. To balance the load evenly
and to keep load distribution consistent across dierent benchmark runs each ZooKeeper
server had exactly 300 ZooKeeper clients connected to it. We used a controller node (N7)
to send workload commands to and get the count of completed operations from clients.
The controller collects the number of completed operations every 300<B from clients and
samples them every 6B .
5.2 Workload
All benchmarks were run with asynchronous APIs. Each client creates an ephemeral znode
and performs, depending on the workload set by the controller, repeated getData (read) or
setData (write) operations on its znode. Every client has at most 100 outstanding requests.
Depending on the benchmark run we change the request size and hash function used for
digest calculation.
5.3 Impact of online comparisons
As discussed in 4.2, every replica server upon applying a transaction computes digest. To
measure the impact of this on throughput, we ran a benchmark with and without fault
detection enabled. Each request was either a read or write of 1KiB of data. We did not use
an external auditor for comparing digests as it is external to ZooKeeper service and its
impact is relatively trivial from the ZooKeeper performance viewpoint. While computing
the digest of a znode along with node data, the digest calculator uses znode’s path and
stats. The size of the path and stats in our experiments was 17B and 60B, respectively.
In Figure 5.2, we show throughput as we vary the percentage of the read re-
quest. The blue line illustrates baseline ZooKeeper throughput, and the orange line shows
throughput with fault detection in online mode. As shown in Figure 5.2, when fault detec-
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Figure 5.2: Throughput with online comparison technique
tion is enabled, throughput decreases. When all operations are read throughput remains
the same. For 100% write operations throughput decreases by only around 2% which is
relatively minimal overhead.
In Figure 5.2, the dierence between baseline and online comparison is highest
when the read to write ratio is between 40-70 percent. It seems to be inuenced by two
factors: nature of the workload and FIFO client ordering provided by ZooKeeper [22]. In our
experiments, every client performs a repeated read or write operation on its distinct znode.
Also, each client remains connected to only one replica server throughput a benchmark
run. Since digest calculations cause extra compute load, write operations spend more
time in CommitProcessor, which consequently delays the processing of read requests. In
between 40-70 percent there are substantial write requests that delay the processing of a
large number of read requests and this results in a substantial drop in overall throughput.
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5.4 Impact of realtime detection
In Figure 5.3, we show throughput with and without realtime digest. The blue line illustrates
the baseline throughput. The blue line illustrates baseline ZooKeeper throughput, and the
orange line shows throughput when doing realtime fault detection. As discussed in 4.3,
when using the realtime detection method, we compute digest twice for every transaction.
First, when a leader receives a state update request from a client, it computes a predictive
Figure 5.3: Throughput with realtime detection technique
digest (i.e. digest that reects changes captured in a given transaction). This is handled
in the PrepRequestProcessor of a leader server. Second, when replica servers apply a
transaction to their DataTree. This is handled in CommitProcessor. Calculating predictive
digest on every transaction adds additional compute load on the leader server which in
turn negatively impacts overall write throughput. For 100% write operations throughput
dierence between baseline and realtime detection with CRC-32 is around 20%.
As shown in Figure 5.4, the realtime detection method incurs a relatively higher
performance penalty than the online comparison method. However, the benets of doing
byzantine fault detection in realtime outweigh its cost.
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Figure 5.4: Throughput - online comparison vs realtime detection
5.5 Impact of hash functions
To understand how performance changes with dierent hash functions, we measured
throughput with CRC-32, MD5, SHA, SHA-256, and SHA-512 for both online comparison
and realtime detection methods.
Figure 5.5: Throughput with dierent hash functions in online comparison technique
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In Figure 5.5 we show throughput of online comparison method with dierent
hash functions. In Figure 5.6 we show throughput of realtime detection method with
dierent hash functions. In both gures, the blue lines indicate baseline throughput. Other
lines correspond to a dierent hash function used in fault detection. As shown in Figure
5.5 and Figure 5.6, the throughput of ZooKeeper with byzantine fault detection changes
with the hash function used to calculate the digest.
Figure 5.6: Throughput with dierent hash functions in realtime detection technique
The performance penalty incurred when using CRC-32 is the lowest while it is
highest for SHA-256. Also, the performance with a more secure SHA-512 is better than
SHA-256. The choice of hash function presents a trade-o between performance and
collision resistance. A weak hash function incurs a minimal performance penalty than
a strong hash function; however, condence in detection is also low with a weak hash
function than the strong hash function. Table 5.2 and Table 5.2 show percentage dierence
between throughput of baseline and dierent hash functions used for online comparison
and realtime detection, respectively.
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Table 5.1: Throughput percentage dierence between baseline and online comparison
% hash functions used in online comparison
read requests CRC-32 MD5 SHA-256 SHA-512 SHA
0 2 1 4 2 0
10 2 4 13 8 7
20 6 9 20 14 12
30 4 9 20 15 12
40 6 9 23 18 14
50 6 11 25 21 16
60 7 12 24 21 17
70 7 10 22 18 15
80 5 9 19 16 13
90 4 7 15 12 11
Table 5.2: Throughput percentage dierence between baseline and realtime detection
% hash functions used in realtime digest
read requests CRC-32 MD5 SHA-256 SHA-512 SHA
0 20 15 39 38 31
10 15 17 41 36 30
20 16 18 45 38 31
30 12 15 42 37 26
40 12 14 40 34 28
50 9 14 37 28 24
60 8 14 29 25 20
70 6 11 25 19 16
80 6 9 22 15 14
90 4 7 17 12 12
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5.6 Impact of requests sizes
The cost of updating a digest using incremental hashing directly depends on the size of the
change. To understand how performance changes with request sizes we ran a benchmark
with various request sizes. Figures from 5.7 to 5.11 shows throughput when using various
request sizes in both online comparison and realtime digest method. For larger request
sizes such as 1K, 2K the dierence in throughput is more pronounced than the smaller
request sizes such as 64B. In summary, large request sizes with strong collision-resistant
hash functions incur a high-performance penalty.
(a) Online digest comparison (b) Realtime digest comparison
Figure 5.7: Throughput comparison - request size 64B
(a) Online digest comparison (b) Realtime digest comparison
Figure 5.8: Throughput comparison - request size 256B
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(a) Online digest comparison (b) Realtime digest comparison
Figure 5.9: Throughput comparison - request size 512B
(a) Online digest comparison (b) Realtime digest comparison
Figure 5.10: Throughput comparison - request size 1024B
(a) Online digest comparison (b) Realtime digest comparison
Figure 5.11: Throughput comparison - request size 2048B
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Chapter 6
Technical Challenges in Evaluation
Measuring the performance of distributed systems is a challenging task. Several factors
such as clock skew, load distribution pose challenges for getting consistent performance
measurements. In this chapter, we will discuss some of the challenges we faced during
performance evaluation.
Clock drift
ZooKeeper benchmark utility relies on timestamps to count the number of completed
operations in an interval by all clients. When we have multiple clients running on dierent
machines, to accurately calculate total requests completed, the timestamps generated by
clients need to match.
Zookeeper benchmark tool uses System.nanoTime() to get the timestamps. These
timestamps dier from JVM to JVM as System.nanoTime() method returns the nanoseconds
since some xed but arbitrary origin time [24]. This means that when we start two machines
at a dierent time, the timestamp we get with System.nanoTime() on these machines will
dier substantially. When timestamps do not match, the collector fails to properly sample
the number of completed operations in a particular period. To resolve this issue, we replaced
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System.nanoTime() with clock time, i.e., System.currentTimeMillis(). The granularity of
System.currentTimeMillis() depends on the underlying operating system. Our systems
used chrony to synchronize the system clock with a local NTP server. It provides accuracy
within tens of microseconds for machines on a LAN which is an acceptable drift for our
measurements [23]. With this approach, we were able to get consistent time intervals on
both the controller and clients.
Inconsistent load distribution
Every ZooKeeper client connects to an arbitrary server from the given connectString
(comma separated host-port address list of ZooKeeper servers). Clients employ a proba-
bilistic load-balancing scheme that tries to ensure that the number of clients per server is
the same for every server. Since this is the best-eort scheme, it is not deterministic, and
the number of clients per server may vary across dierent runs of the benchmark. This
nondeterminism causes variations in performance benchmark measurements. To solve
this problem, we created a static mapping of clients and servers so that, for every run, each
server has exactly the same number of clients connected to it.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we rst described the importance of handling non-malicious byzantine
faults in ZooKeeper. We then discussed why doing a fault-detection is cheaper than fault-
tolerance to deal with non-malicious byzantine faults. This thesis also describes three
dierent approaches to detect byzantine faults.
In the rst approach, we compare replicas using transaction logs and snapshots
in an oine mode with the help of an external consistency checker. The oine comparison
method is the simplest but least eective method. In the second approach, every replica
maintains a digest log representing its state at dierent points in time. It employs an
external auditor to compare replicas using these digests in an online mode. This approach
is better than the oine comparison method; however, it does not help in completely
preventing error propagation. In the third approach, the leader computes a predictive digest
for every transaction and sends it along with a transaction proposal to the followers. After
applying a transaction to DataTree, a follower updates its digest and then compares it with
the leader’s digest. This enables real-time fault detection and prevents error propagation
from one replica to another replica and clients as well.
This thesis further presents a performance evaluation of ZooKeeper with byzan-
tine fault detection. Our evaluation shows that both online comparison and real-time
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detection technique enables very good performance while incurring an acceptable per-
formance penalty. The performance penalty of online comparison and realtime detection
for 100% writes with CRC-32 as hash function in AdHASH is around 2% and 20%, respec-
tively. The performance penalty, however, varies with the hash function used to compute
incremental digests. Typically, strong collision-resistant hash functions come with high
condence in fault detection and relatively high costs than weak collision-resistant hash
functions.
To conclude, this thesis demonstrates that the real-time fault detection method
provides improved reliability with minimal performance cost and no additional deployment
cost. And hence this technique is feasible to use in production systems to safeguard
reliability.
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